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This  paper  aims   to   show   the   relevance  of  Ricœur’s  notion  of   the   self   for  postmodern   feminist   theory,  but  
also  to  critically  assess  it.  By  bringing  Ricœur’s  “self”  into  dialogue  with  Braidotti’s,  Irigaray’s  and  Butler’s  
conceptions  of  the  subject,  it  shows  that  it  is  close  to  the  feminist  self  in  that  it  is  articulated  into  language,  is  
embodied  and  not  fully  conscious  of  itself.  In  the  course  of  the  argument,  the  major  point  of  divergence  also  
comes   to   light,   namely,   that   the   former   considers   discourse   to   be   a   laboratory   for   thought   experiments,  
while   the   latter   consider   discourse   to   be   normative,   restrictive   and   exclusive.   In   the   second   part,   the  
possibility   of   critique   and   change   are   further   developed.   Ricœur   does   not   rule   out   critique,   rather  
interpretation   includes   distanciation   and   critique.   Finally,   his   notion   of   productive   imagination   explains  
how  new  identifications  become  possible.    
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Résumé 
Cet  article  vise  à  démontrer,  en  l'ʹévaluant  de  manière  critique,  l’importance  de  la  notion  de  soi  chez  Ricœur  
pour  la  théorie  féministe  postmoderne.  Mettant  en  dialogue  sa  pensée  avec  celle  de  Braidotti,  d’Irigaray  et  
de  Butler,  l'ʹauteure  montre  que  la  notion  ricoeurienne  de  soi  est  assez  proche  de  la  pensée  féministe.  Car  le  
soi  est  articulé  dans  la  langue,  il  est  incarné  et  pas  entièrement  conscient  de  lui-­‐‑même.  Après  avoir  cherché  à  
montrer   la   proximité  des  deux   styles  de  pensée,   l'ʹauteure   attarde   sur   le   point   crucial   de   leur  divergence.  
Tandis  que  Ricoeur  tient  à  considérer  le  discours  comme  un  laboratoire  pour  des  expériences  de  pensée  de  
soi,   les   penseurs   féministes   l'ʹappréhendent   comme   quelque   chose   de   normatif,   de   restrictif   et   d'ʹexcluant.  
Dans  la  seconde  partie  de  l'ʹarticle,   la  possibilité  d'ʹune  critique  et  d'ʹune  transformation  du  soi  est  explorée.  
Ricoeur   soutient   que   l'ʹinterprétation   implique   aussi   bien   la   distanciation   que   la   critique.   Ainsi   sa   notion  
d'ʹimagination  productive  explique  comment  de  nouvelles  identifications  deviennent  possibles.  
Mot-­‐‑clés:    Le  soi,  Critique,  Transformation,  Irigaray,  Butler    
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Paul   Ricœur   is   one   of   the   most   important   philosophical   anthropologists   of   the   20th  
century.   He   develops   an   extensive   notion   of   the   self   from   different   sources:   the   analytical  
discussion  about  personal   identity,   contemporary   theories  of  narrativity,   classical  philosophical  
sources,   such  as  Aristotle,   and  contemporary  phenomenology  and  hermeneutics.  The  notion  of  
the   self   also   is  one  of   the   central  points  of  debate   in   feminist   theory.   “It   is  pivotal   to  questions  
about  personhood,  identity,  the  body,  and  agency  that  feminism  must  address,”  as  Diana  Meyers  
explains  in  introducing  the  feminist  self.1  In  this  paper,  it  is  my  aim  to  demonstrate  that  Ricœur’s  
reflections  on  the  self  are  of  interest  for  feminist  theory.    
Ricœur  is  not  among  the  continental  thinkers  in  contemporary  history,  such  as  Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty,   Derrida,   Deleuze,   who   are   much   referred   to   in   feminist   theory.2   One   of   the   possible  
reasons  is  that  feminist  theory  is  normative,  and  criticizes  the  discrimination  of  women  and  other  
non-­‐‑hegemonic  groups  within  society.  Hermeneutics,  and  specifically  Gadamer’s  hermeneutics,  
as   Lorraine   Code   signaled   in   Feminist   Interpretations   of   Hans-­‐‑Georg   Gadamer,3   shows   a   lack   of  
awareness  of  the  workings  of  power  in  processes  of  understanding.  Although  Ricœur  cannot  be  
accused   of   ignoring   power,   he   also   does   not   differ   from   mainstream   hermeneutics   in   not  
considering  the  uneven  distributions  of  power  that  are  related  to  gender  differences.4  
Another  reason  for  feminist  thinkers  not  to  work  with  Ricœur  could  be  that  he  does  not  
explicitly   address   themes   that   are   of   interest   to   them,   such   as   embodiment,   deconstruction,  
difference.   Ricœur’s   philosophy   for   many   feminists   perhaps   is   too   continuous   with   the  
philosophical   tradition,   that   they   criticize   for   its   masculinity,   and   too   uncritical   of   it   to   be   of  
interest.  As  I  will  demonstrate  in  this  paper,  however,  Ricœur’s  hermeneutical  notion  of  the  self  is  
not  so  far  apart  from  the  one  found  in  feminist  theory.  It  is  much  more  “postmodern”  than  one  at  
first  sight  would  assume.  The  main  feminist  theories  of  the  self  that  I  will  bring  his  thought  into  
dialogue  with   (in   the   first  part  of   the  paper),   are   the  postmodern  ones  of  Luce   Irigaray,   Judith  
Butler   and   Rosi   Braidotti.   I   consider   these   the   most   influential   and   original   ones   in   feminist  
theory.  Apart  from  showing  the  convergences  between  Ricœur  and  these  feminist  philosophers,  I  
also  want  to  critically  assess  his  “self”  from  a  feminist  perspective  (in  the  second  part),  by  asking  
how  much  room  his  notion  of  the  self  leaves  for  normative  critique.  I  will  not  take  one  side  or  the  
other,  but  aim  at  a  constructive  dialogue  between  Ricœur  and  feminist  theory.    
Ricœur  and  the  Feminist  Self  
In   order   to   relate   Ricœur’s   hermeneutical   self   with   feminist   theory,   the   notion   of   the  
“feminist  self”  needs  to  be  circumscribed  first.  The  three  feminist  philosophers  -­‐‑  Irigaray,  Butler  
and  Braidotti   -­‐‑  do  not  share  a  similar  notion  of  the  self,   instead  they  articulate  different  aspects  
and  critiques  of  the  self,  as  will  become  clear  soon.  A  good  starting  point,  though,  can  be  found  in  
Rosi  Braidotti’s  Nomadic  Subjects,   in  which  she   lists   the  characteristics  of  a   feminist  postmodern  
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notion   of   the   self.   These   characteristics   are   general   enough   to   be   applicable   to   all   three  
theoreticians.   Braidotti   writes   that   the   feminist   self   is   not   one,   in   the   sense   that   it   is,   “a  
multiplicity   in   herself”   and   consists   of      “a   network   of   levels   of   experience,”   it   is   “not   one  
conscious   subject,   but   also   the   subject   of   her   unconscious”   and   it   holds   “an   imaginary  
relationship  to  variables  like  class,  race,  age,  sexual  choices.”5 The  feminist  self,   in  the  words  of  
Braidotti,   forms   itself   by   identifying   with   successive   social-­‐‑cultural   representations,   it   is  
embodied,   and   its  materiality   is   coded   in   language.   Its   body   cannot  be   fully   apprehended  and  
represented.   It   cannot  be   captured  by   consciousness,   but   is   conditioned  by   the  unconscious.   In  
what  follows,  I  develop  these  characteristics  under  three  headings:  the  self  articulates  itself   into  
language,  it  is  embodied,  and  it  is  not  fully  conscious  of  itself.  I  will  show  to  what  extent  Ricœur’s  
notion  of  the  self  incorporates  these  traits  of  the  feminist  self.  
The   self   articulates   itself   in   language.  The  notion  of   the   self   that  Paul  Ricœur  develops   in  
Oneself   as   Another   and   later   texts   can   be   considered   as   the   synthesis   of,   but   also   further  
elaboration  on,  the  notion  of  the  subject  in  his  earlier  works.  He  situates  it  in  one  of  the  texts  in  
which   he   sketches   his   intellectual   trajectory,   “On   Interpretation,”6   as   part   of   the   tradition   of  
reflexive   philosophy,7 which   in   Ricœur’s   case   forms   a   hermeneutical   variation   of   Husserlian  
phenomenology.  Reflexive  philosophy  is  the  mode  of  thought  that  takes  its  point  of  departure  in  
Descartes’s   cogito,   and   is   further   developed   by   Kant   and   French   post-­‐‑Kantians   such   as   Jean  
Nabert.   The   notion   of   self-­‐‑understanding   is   one   of   the   central   philosophical   problems   in   this  
stream  of  thought.  Reflection  is  circumscribed  as  “that  act  of  turning  back  upon  itself  by  which  a  
subject  grasps,  in  a  moment  of  intellectual  clarity  and  moral  responsibility,  the  unifying  principle  
of   the  operations  among  which   it   is  dispersed  and  forgets   itself  as  subject.”8  The  subject  comes  
into   existence  “after   the  deed,”   so   to   speak,   in   retrospect,   and   in   turning  back  upon   its   actions  
comes  to  understand  itself  as  an  agent.  
So  far,  Ricœur’s  notion  of   the  self   is  very  much  in   line  with  the  philosophical   tradition:  
the  coherence  and  transparency  of  the  self,  that  is  contested  by  many  feminist  theorists,  is  central  
to   reflexive  philosophy.  Whereas   the   feminists  understand   the  self   to  be  multiple  and  not   fully  
conscious   of   itself,   the   idea  of   reflection   includes   the  desire   of   a  perfect   coincidence   of   the   self  
with  itself.  In  that  respect  the  differences  between  Ricœur  and  feminist  theory  couldn’t  be  larger.  
But  Ricœur  does  not  leave  it  to  that.  Already  in  “On  Interpretation,”  he  situates  his  philosophy  as  
a   hermeneutical   version   of   phenomenology,   implicating   that   the   reflexive   subject   is   neither  
immediately   present   to   itself,   nor   transparent   to   itself.   It   rather   participates   in   the   world   and  
belongs  to  it;  it  is  thrown  into  the  world  and  can  only  understand  itself  through  the  externalities  
that  it  creates,  by  means  of  a  detour.  Ricœur  draws  from  hermeneutics  the  implication  that  self-­‐‑
understanding   is   mediated   by   signs,   symbols   and   texts,   and   that   it   “coincides   with   the  
interpretation   given   to   these   mediating   terms.”9   Understanding   oneself   for   him   means  
comprehending   oneself   as   one   confronts   a   text.   The   implications   of   this   notion   of   self-­‐‑
understanding   are   twofold.  The   subject   is   not   immediately   transparent   to   itself,   nor   capable  of  
self-­‐‑knowledge,   but   interprets   itself.10   And   it   has   a   double   subjectivity   as   author   and   reader,  
neither  one  being  more  original  than  the  other.  
The  notion  of  the  self  that  Ricœur  develops  ten  years  later  in  Oneself  as  Another  draws  the  
consequences   of   the   hermeneutical   view   of   self-­‐‑understanding.   Now,   he   perceives   personal  
identity  as  narrative.  The  capacity  to  narrate  “occupies  a  pre-­‐‑eminent  place  among  the  capacities,  
insofar   as   events   of   whatever   origin   become   legible   and   intelligible   only   when   recounted   in  
stories.”11   The   idea   that   personal   identity   is   narrative   implies   that   the   self   understands   itself  
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identity,  in  other  words,  does  not  pertain  to  the  story  of  my  life,  but  to  the  network  of  stories  in  
which   I   figure.   The  narrativity   of   personal   identity   also   implies   that   the   self   does   not   coincide  
with  itself,  as  idem  identity,  but  incorporates  the  possibility  of  change,  namely  “the  identity  of  the  
narrative  plot  that  remains  unfinished  and  open  to  the  possibility  of  being  told  differently  or  of  
letting  itself  be  told  by  others.”12  And,  furthermore,  narrative  identity  implies  that  the  self  is  the  
narrator  of  its  life,  without,  however,  becoming  its  author.13  
   Thus,  in  Ricœur’s  perspective,  the  self  forms  itself  and  understands  itself  by  relating  to  
the  stories,  signs  and  symbols  of  the  culture  in  which  it  lives.  This  self  is  close  to  the  feminist  one  
that  constitutes  itself  by  relating  to  the  representations  in  the  symbolic  order.14 The  feminist  self  
articulates   and   understands   itself   in   the   available   language   as  well.   The   psychoanalytical   idea  
that  subjectivity  articulates  itself  in  language,  and  that  there  is  no  subject  if  it  is  not  articulated,  is  
central.   As   Braidotti   claims:   “It   is   obviously   the   inscription   into   language   that   makes   the  
embodied  subject   into  a  speaking   ‘I’.   In  my  understanding,   there  can  be  no  subjectivity  outside  
sexuality  or  language…”15 The  feminist  and  the  Ricœurian  self,  thus,  both  articulate  themselves  
into  language.  Yet,  feminists  do  not  refer  to  the  self  as  “narrative,”  as  Ricœur  does.  
Like   Ricœur,   Judith   Butler   speaks   of   narrativity,   but   she   emphasizes   the   limits   of   the  
possibility  to  give  a  narrative  account  of  oneself,  rather  than  addressing  its  opportunities.  Typical  
for  her  work   is   the  Foucaultian   idea   that   subjects   are  produced   in   regulatory  power  processes.  
Narrativity   for   her   is   the   form   in   which   the   subject   can   refer   to   its   own   genesis,   but   the  
constitution   of   the   subject   has   already   taken   place.   “The   subject   loses   itself   to   tell   the   story   of  
itself…”16   In   a   later   text,   Giving   an   Account   of   Oneself,   she   holds   the   narrative   to   be   “the  
prerequisite   condition   for   any   account   of  moral   agency.”17 Yet,   here   she   again   claims   that   the  
narrative   does   not   originate   from   an   independently  willing   and   choosing   subject,   because   the  
narrative  is  “disoriented  by  what   is  not  mine,  or  not  mine  alone.”  It   is  disoriented  by  the  set  of  
norms  that  challenge  the  originality  and  singularity  of  one’s  story.  By  telling  a  narrative,  I  at  once  
give  an  account  of  myself  and  make  myself  “substitutable.”18  
Butler  exemplifies   the   limits  of   the  possibility   to  narrate,   that   in  Ricœur’s  account   for  a  
large  part  remain  unarticulated.  She  expresses  the  necessary  incoherence  and  incompleteness  of  
the   (narrative)   self,   and  makes   us   aware   of   the   implications   connected  with   narrative   identity  
being  articulated  in  a  language  that,  in  a  Lacanian  phrase,  belongs  to  “the  other.”  There  is  a  non-­‐‑
narrativizable  exposure   to   the  other   to  which   I  address  my  account  of  myself;   there   is  a  bodily  
referent  that  forms  a  condition  for  my  narrative  and  that  I  cannot  narrate  fully;  the  unconscious  is  
perhaps   implicitly   but   not   explicitly   part   of  my   life   story;   there   are   primary   relations   that   co-­‐‑
constitute  me  and  of  which  I  cannot  tell  everything;  there  is  a  history  that  establishes  my  partial  
opacity  to  myself;  and  there  are  norms  that  facilitate  my  telling  a  story  about  myself,  but  that  I  do  
not  master   and   that  make  me,  my   story,   substitutable.19 Butler   points   out   that   every  narrative  
about   one’s   life   is   disoriented   by   factors   such   as   embodiment,   the   unconscious,   language   as  
discourse  of  the  other,  history  and  the  normativity  of  discourse.    
For  Irigaray,  likewise,  discourse  is  exclusive.  She  does  not  speak  of  “narrative,”  as  Butler  
does,  but  she   too  suggests   that   there  are   limits   to  what  can  be  expressed   in   language.  Within  a  
discourse   that   is   exclusively   masculine,   it   is   the   feminine   that   cannot   be   articulated.   Being  
sexualized   as   feminine   is   a   “senseless,   inappropriate,   indecent   utterance,”20   she  writes.   In  This  
Sex  Which  Is  Not  One  (1985),  she  calls  this  exclusion  the  motivation  of  her  work:  the  fact  that  the  
articulation  of  the  reality  of  her  sex  is  impossible  in  discourse,  for  a  structural,  eidetic  reason.  
So,  while  Ricœur  and  the  feminist  notion  of  the  self  are  close  in  presuming  that  the  self  
articulates   itself   in   language,   the   feminists   in   contrast   to   Ricœur   lay   claim   on   what   cannot   be  
The  Subject  of  Critique  
  
  
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          
Vol  4,  No  1  (2013)        ISSN  2155-­‐‑1162  (online)        DOI  10.5195/errs.2013.168        http://ricoeur.pitt.edu    
24  
  
articulated   into   language.   They   aim   at   conveying   the   limits   of   discourse,   that   do   not   seem   so  
central  to  Ricœur.    I  will  first  address  Ricœur’s  ideas  about  embodiment  and  the  unconscious  and  
return  to  the  question  of  exclusion  of  discourse  and  inclusion  in  the  second  part  of  the  paper.  
The   self   is   embodied.   For   all   feminist   thinkers,   subjects   are   embodied.   Embodiment   is   a  
central   issue   in   feminist   theory,   because   it   is   on   the   basis   of   their   bodily   characteristics   that  
women  are  discriminated.  But  their  ways  of  relating  to  embodiment  are  different.    
   Irigaray  is  the  feminist  thinkers  who,  in  the  words  of  Tina  Chanter,  “brings  the  body  
back   into   play,   not   as   ‘the   rock   of   feminism’,   but   as   a   mobile   set   of   differences.”21   Irigaray  
criticizes  the  symbolic  division  between  the  feminine,  as  the  material,  corporeal,  sensible,  and  the  
masculine  that  represents  the  spiritual,  ideal,  intelligible  and  transcendental.  She  aims  at  a  culture  
of   sexual   difference   in   which   both   are   valued.   Phallocentric   or   patriarchal   culture   donates   no  
place   to   the   feminine,   and   therewith   to   the   corporeal.   It   remains   culture’s   underside,   its  
unconscious.  When  sexual  difference  is  recognized,  instead,  body  and  language  would  be  joined,  
and  every  woman  and  every  man  would  be  able  to  develop  an  identity  in  relation  to  her  or  his  
body.    
   For   Rosi   Braidotti,   inspired   by   Irigaray   but   also   by   other   French   thinkers   such   as  
Deleuze,   embodiment   includes   a   new   form   of   materialism.   In   a   Deleuzian   fashion,   she  
understands   the   body   as   layer   of   corporeal   materiality,   as   pure   flows   of   energy,   capable   of  
multiple  variations.  Its  materiality   is  coded  into  language,  and  the  self   (as  entity  endowed  with  
identity)  is  anchored  in  this  living  matter.  22   
   Judith   Butler   discusses   embodiment   in   Bodies   That   Matter,   and   develops   a   material  
notion  of  it  as  well.  For  her  the  body  is  matter,  but  not  in  the  sense  of  a  surface  on  which  meaning  
is   inscribed.   Rather,   she   redefines   the   notion   of   matter   to   “materialization,”   which   includes   a  
process  “that   stabilizes  over   time   to  produce   the  effect  of  boundary,   fixity,   and   surface  we  call  
matter.”23  She,  in  other  words,  contends  that  sex  is  something  that  we  do  not  “have,”  or  become,  
but   we   assume   a   sex   by   reiterating   regulatory   norms   that   produce   sex   and   sexuality.   The  
performative  process  in  which  subjects  become  subject,  also  includes  that  the  matter  of  sex  comes  
into   existence.   We   understand   our   bodies   as   sexually   specific   bodies   because   they   become  
intelligible  to  us  in  a  historical-­‐‑cultural  specific  manner.    
   Ricœur  also  considers  the  self  as  embodied.  Already  in  his  early  Freedom  and  Nature,  he  
situates  his  thinking  within  the  phenomenological  tradition  and  refers  to  Gabriël  Marcel’s  notion  
of   incarnation.   The   body   for   Ricœur   is   neither   constituted   objectively,   nor   constitutive   as  
transcendental  subject.   It   rather   is   the  existing  I.24  While   in  his  early  work  the  body  appears  as  
our   incarnation,   mystery   and   spontaneity,   in   his   study   of   the   self   it   appears   as   the  
phenomenological  “I  can,”  but  also  as   fundamental  passivity,  as   I  explained  elsewhere.25   I  will  
not  repeat  the  account  given  there  of  Ricœur’s  notion  of  embodiment,  but  only  want  to  mention  
two   points,   namely   the   relation   between   the   narrative   self   and   its   body,   and   Ricœur’s   careful  
reformulation  of  Husserl’s  primordiality  of  Leib  over  Körper.  The   first  point   illustrates  Ricœur’s  
nuanced  conception  of  the  body,  while  the  second  shows  the  relevance  of  his  account  of  the  body  
for  feminist  theory.  
   For  Ricœur,   it   is   not   the   case   that   the   body   as   some   sort   of   constancy  underlies   the  
variability  of  the  self.  Our  incarnation  for  him  does  not  imply  some  sort  of  stable  embeddedness  
that  is  not  further  reflected  upon.  Rather,  the  structure  of  embodiment  resembles  the  structure  of  
the   self   and   is   only   to   a   certain   extent   narratable.   In   that   sense,   he   comes   close   to  what  Butler  
called   the   bodily   referent   of   the   narrative   that   forms   a   condition   for   my   narrative   and   that   I  
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represented.  In  discussing  personal  identity,  Ricœur  objects  to  identifications  of  the  self  with  the  
psyche  or  mind,  and  the  body  with  some  sort  of  material  constancy  of  the  self.  For  him,  the  body  
cannot  be  associated  with  that  which  remains  the  same,  in  distinction  to  the  self  as  psychological  
(mind)  or  spiritual  (soul).  He  does  not  want  to  enter  into  discussions  like  those  in  the  analytical  
tradition   over   the   best   criterion   for   identity:   psychological   or   corporeal.26   He   also   does   not  
associate  the  psychological  criterion  with  ipse,  and  the  corporeal  criterion  with  idem.  The  idem-­‐‑ipse  
distinction,   thus,   does   not   pertain   to   the   body-­‐‑mind   split,   and   the   body   does   not   form   the  
permanent  part  of  our  being.  It  does  not  even  resemble  itself:  “One  only  has  to  compare  two  self-­‐‑
portraits  of  Rembrandt.”27 But  also,   the  body   is  not   foreign   to   selfhood.  For   the   self   can   claim:  
“this   is   my   body.”   The   mineness   of   the   body   that   Ricœur   assumes   in   following   the  
phenomenologists  even  forms  “the  most  overwhelming  testimony  in  favor  of  the  irreducibility  of  
selfhood  to  sameness.”28  
   The  body,  thus,  is  not  to  be  understood  as  the  constancy  of  the  self,  and  is  not  simply  
the  material  side  of   the  self.  Rather,   the  body   incorporates  whatness  and  whoness   in   itself.  The  
idem-­‐‑ipse  dialectics  that  characterizes  narrative  identity  has  a  counterpart  in  the  understanding  of  
our  body.  The  body,   for  Ricœur,  belongs   to   two  orders:   the  order  of   things   (whatness)  and   the  
order  of  self  experience  (who-­‐‑ness).  In  correspondence  with  Husserl,  he  distinguishes  Körper  and  
Leib.29 The  whatness  of  the  body  coincides  with  its  being  Körper  and  its  whoness  with  being  Leib.  
Both   aspects   of   embodiment   are  narratable,   and   thus   can  be  part   of  narrative   identity.  We   can  
recall  bodily  experiences,  explain  what  we  feel  and  how  it  feels,  which  are  Leib-­‐‑aspects;  and  we  
can   objectify   our   body,   speak   about   its   characteristics,   what   it   shares   with   others,   in   short,  
exemplify   its  Körper-­‐‑aspects.  What   is   articulable   about,   and   is   articulated  of,   the  body   can  be  a  
component  of  narrative  identity,  which  thus  incorporates  its  body.  But  the  self  cannot  express  its  
body   entirely;   for   it   also   articulates   itself   by  means   of   this   same   body  upon  which   it   does   not  
reflect,  but  that  shows  itself  in  hesitations,  slips  of  the  tongue  and  emotions.  And,  not  everything  
of   the   body   is   narratable:   it   also   is   a  mystery.30 In   his   account   of   sexuality,   in   the   short   essay  
“Wonder,   Eroticism,   and   Enigma”   (1994),   Ricœur   speaks   of   the   body   as   a   mystery   and   as  
escaping  linguistic  articulation  as  well.31 The  body  thus  also  exceeds  narrative  identity.  
   Similar  to  the  feminist  account  of  embodiment,  Ricœur’s   implies  that  the  body  is  not  
fully  narratable.  But  in  contrast  to  the  feminist  notion  of  the  body,  in  which  it  is  matter  (Braidotti,  
Butler)   as  well   as   something   that   excludes   from   the   symbolic   and   that   culture   should   relate   to  
(Irigaray),   Ricœur   seems   to   consider   the   body  primarily   as   our   habitat   and   situation.  While   in  
feminist  theory,  the  body  is  not  only  lived  subject  or  something  that  escapes  us,  but  also  a  reality  
to  which  meanings  are  attached,  Ricœur  seems  to  stress  mainly   its  non  constancy  and  escaping  
linguistic   articulation.   As   I   will   demonstrate,   however,   apart   from   that,   he   also   reformulates  
Husserl’s  Körper-­‐‑notion.   It   is   precisely   his   hermeneutical   account   of   the   body   as   body   among  
other   bodies   that   brings   him   close   to   feminist   theory,   closer   than   a   strictly   phenomenological  
account  of   the  body.   In  other  words,   I   think   that  his  hermeneutic  notion  of   embodiment  offers  
more  openings  for  feminist  theory  than  the  phenomenological  ones  that  are  often  referred  to  by  
feminist  philosophers.32  
   Ricœur  in  the  last  chapter  of  Oneself  as  Another  returns  to  the  relationship  between  the  
body  as  flesh  (Leib)  and  Körper.33  Körper  for  him  mainly  implies  being  a  body  among  other  bodies,  
that  is,  one  among  many.  It  makes  that  the  self  understands  itself  as  part  of  a  community  and  is  
open  to  the  world.  In  contrast  to  Husserl,  Ricœur  claims  that  the  body’s  being  Körper   is  equally  
original  as  its  being  Leib,  flesh.  While  Husserl,  who  is  concerned  with  the  problem  of  constitution,  
understands  the  body  as  Leib  to  be  primordial,  Ricœur  aims  at  thinking  it  as  Leib  and  Körper  at  the  
The  Subject  of  Critique  
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same  time.  Our  experience  of  the  body  as  one  among  many  for  him  is  as  primordial  as  its  being  
Leib.  Because  of  our  embodiment  we  perceive  ourselves  as  open  to  the  world,  we  find  ourselves  
in  the  world,  and  we  appear  in  the  world.    
   It   is  precisely   through  his   reformulation  of   the   relation  between  Leib   and  Körper   that  
Ricœur’s  perspective  on  embodiment  comes  closer  to  feminist  theory  than  Husserl’s  or  Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty’s  .  Most  feminist  accounts  of  embodiment  have  in  common  that  they  perceive  the  body  as  
an  inalienable  part  of  our  identity  that  comes  to  be  signified  in  the  symbolic  order  in  a  way  that  is  
restrictive.   The   symbolic   either   does   not   enable   feminine   identities   to   come   into   existence   as  
feminine  (Irigaray),  or  prefers  clearly  masculine  or  feminine  heterosexual  identities  (Butler).  The  
body  in  feminist  theory  is  not  only  the  site  of  experience,  our  habitat  and  situation,  but  it  places  
the   self   into   the  world.   It   is   signified  matter,   the   point   of   application   for   normative  meanings.  
Thinking   the   body   from   a   feminist   perspective,   thus,   includes   both:   considering   it   as   lived  
experience,   and   as   a   field   of  meanings   through  which   normative   processes   signify   our   bodies.  
This   implies   that   a   phenomenological   account   of   embodiment,   in   which   its   mineness   is  
primordial,  is  limited  from  a  feminist  perspective.  For  a  feminist  account  of  embodiment  should  
include  a  perspective  on  what  it  implies  to  be  situated  in  the  world  as  well.  Ricœur  develops  such  
an   account.   His   phenomenological-­‐‑hermeneutical   notion   of   embodiment   makes   that   it   is  
understood  as  lived  experience,  but  also  as  body  among  other  bodies.  Precisely  as  situated  in  the  
world,   among   other   bodies,   the   body   receives   social  meanings   and   is   understood   as   the   point  
where  normative  social  structures  cross,  which  at  once  situate  the  individual  socially,  as  influence  
its  self-­‐‑understanding.  
The  self   is  not  fully  conscious  of  itself.  The  psychoanalytical  notion  of  the  unconscious  also  
plays  an  important  role  in  feminist  theory.  Braidotti  considers  the  feminist  self  to  be  subject  of  her  
unconscious,   Butler   understands   the   unconscious   to   be   implicitly   part   of   one’s   life-­‐‑story,   and  
Irigaray   speaks   of   the   feminine-­‐‑maternal   as   unconscious   within   a   patriarchal   culture.34   In  
feminist   theory,   the   unconscious   points   to   the   repressed   underside   of   patriarchal   culture,   as   a  
potential  site  of  resistance  and  as  a  limit  to  the  self’s  possibilities  for  self-­‐‑understanding.  Ricœur  
in  Freud  and  Philosophy  and  several  articles  also  considers  the  unconscious  as  a  force  that  radically  
puts   into  question  consciousness  and   the  possibilities  of   self-­‐‑understanding.35 So,  how  do  both  
relate?  I  will  concentrate  upon  the  implications  of  the  notion  of  the  unconscious  for  the  self  here  
and   will   set   aside   the   unconscious   as   a   means   of   criticizing   the   symbolic,   which   also   is   an  
important  interpretation  given  to  it  in  feminist  theory.36  
What  does  it  mean  for  a  philosophy  of  the  self  to  acknowledge  the  unconscious?  Ricœur  
contends  the  challenge  that  Freudian  psychoanalysis  poses  to  philosophies  of  self-­‐‑  consciousness  
.  The  unconscious,  first  of  all,  puts  into  question  the  Cartesian  suggestion  that  self-­‐‑knowledge  can  
be   immediately  certain.   It  suspends  the  properties  of  consciousness,  and   in   that  sense   forms  an  
“anti-­‐‑phenomenology.”37   A   philosophy   of   consciousness   has   become   impossible,   since  
consciousness   cannot   totalize   itself.   But   that   the   unconscious   is   not   conscious   in   Freudian  
psychoanalysis   does   not   imply   that   it   is   also   unknowable.   It   rather   manifests   itself   in   its  
representations,   that   can   be   known   in   so   far   as   they   appear   in   the   field   of   consciousness   (in  
dreams,  free  association,  etc.).  Also,  in  order  to  be  analyzable,  the  unconscious  needs  to  articulate  
itself.  
Ricœur   objects   to   naïve   realism,   that   is,   to   seeing   the   unconscious   as   “some   fanciful  
reality  with   the   extraordinary   ability   of   thinking   in  place   of   consciousness.”38   The  unconscious  
does   not   think   –   and   Freud  never   said   so.   It   is   relative   to   consciousness,   instead,   because   it   is  
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Freudian   notion   of   the   unconscious   to   a   Cartesian   immediately   self-­‐‑certain   consciousness,   but  
asks  what   happens   to   it  when   it   is   opposed   to   a  Hegelian  mediate   notion   of   consciousness   as  
limit-­‐‑idea,   that  guarantees  and  understands   itself  only   in  every  next   step.   In  psychoanalysis  he  
discovers   another   hermeneutics,   that   is   regressive,   beneath   the   progressive   (Hegelian)  
hermeneutics  that  considers  the  development  of  consciousness.  The  meaning  of  the  unconscious  
for  him  is  that  understanding  always  comes  out  of  preceding  figures,  in  a  temporal  or  symbolic  
sense.  “Man  is  the  only  being  that  is  subject  to  his  childhood.”39    
   How  is  this  unconscious  related  to  consciousness?  For  Ricœur,  both  are  not  opposed,  
and  man  nor  woman  is  a  simple  addition  of  the  two  orders,  unconscious  and  consciousness,  but  
both   cover   exactly   the   same   field.   “[A]   phenomenology   of   spirit   and   an   archaeology   of   the  
unconscious  speak  not  of  two  halves  of  man,  but  each  one  of  the  whole  of  man.”40  The  Freudian  
theory  of  the  subject  has  displaced  the  subject,  in  the  sense  that  neither  consciousness  nor  the  ego  
are  in  the  position  of  principle  or  origin  anymore.  Instead  of  understanding  the  self  as  conscious  
of   itself,   Freud   speaks   of   its   gradual   becoming-­‐‑conscious.   That   implies   that   self-­‐‑knowledge   for  
Ricœur  forms  a  “limit-­‐‑idea,”  the  terminal  situation  of  consciousness.41  Consciousness  becomes  a  
task  or  goal,  and  the  Cartesian  self  has  lost  the  assurance  of  its  self.  It  does  no  longer  know  what  
it   is.   The   cogito   becomes   a   wounded   cogito,   that   posits   but   does   not   possess   itself,   claims  
Ricœur.42    
   Even  though  the  self  articulates   itself   in   language,  and  even  though  “language  is   the  
primary   condition   of   all   human   experience,”43   Ricœur’s   notion   of   the   narrative   self   does   not  
imply  that  he  considers  the  self  as  purely  conscious  and  that  he  forgets  the  unconscious.  Rather,  
for  Ricœur  the  self  fundamentally  does  not  own  itself;  it  articulates  itself  and  interprets  itself,  but  
does  not  completely  know  itself.  Ricœur  furthermore  demonstrates  that  the  unconscious  can  only  
be  understood  because  it  is  articulated.  As  he  claims,  for  Freud  there  is  “no  emotional  experience  
so   deeply   buried,   so   concealed   or   so   distorted   that   it   cannot   be   brought   up   to   the   clarity   of  
language   and   so   revealed   in   its   own   proper   sense,   thanks   to   desire’s   access   to   language.”44  
Psychoanalysis,   as   a   talking-­‐‑cure,   is   based   on   this   very   hypothesis   of   the   primary   proximity  
between  desire  and  speech.    
Ricœur  perhaps  is  not  a  thinker  of  deconstruction,  difference  or  multiplicity,  and  for  that  
reason  not  popular  among  feminist  theorists,  but  I  hope  to  have  shown  that  his  notion  of  the  self  
is  not  so  far  apart  from  the  postmodern  feminist  self  that  Braidotti,  Butler  and  Irigaray  develop.  
There  is  a  continuity  in  that  the  self  articulates  itself  and  becomes  a  self  in  language,  is  embodied,  
and  is  not  fully  conscious  of  itself.  Rosi  Braidotti  writes  that  the  feminist  self  is  a  multiplicity,  that  
consists  of  a  network  of  levels  of  experience.  Ricœur’s  self  similarly  is  not  constant  and  singular,  
but   understands   itself   in   relation   to   the   narratives   of   others,   and   is   subject   to   change.  What   is  
more,  Ricœur’s   self   is   split,   for  narrative   identity  does  not  coincide  with   the  self   -­‐‑   even   though  
there  is  no  other  way  of  understanding  it  than  by  means  of  the  narratives  about  itself.  Ricœur’s  
self  is  split  precisely  because  the  self  is  a  reflexive  subject,  while  narrative  identity  is  the  identity  
created  in  the  life  story.  Narrative  identity  coincides  with  the  protagonist  of  the  life  story,  the  self  
is   the   one   that   tells   that   life   story.   Both   do   not   completely   overlap   –   for   one   can   tell   different  
stories   about   one’s   life.   The   notion   of   the   split   self   perhaps   does   not   completely   overlap  with  
Braidotti’s  multiplicity   of   levels   of   experience,   but   it   does   allow   for   understanding   the   self   by  
means  of  different  accounts  (narratives)  of  itself.  
   However,   apart   from   the   similarity   between   Ricœur   and   postmodern   feminist  
philosophy,  a  major  point  of  disagreement  has  started  to  emerge  as  well.  The  division  does  not  so  
much   lie   in   the   conception   of   the   self   or   subject,   but   rather   in   that   of   discourse.   It   can   be  
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summarized   as   follows:  while   Ricœur   considers   discourse   as   constitutive   for   the   self,   feminist  
philosophers   perceive   it   as   restrictive   (i.e.,   patriarchal,   phallocentric,   heteronormative).  
Patriarchal   representations   do   not   allow   the   development   of   other   kinds   of   self   than   the  
hegemonic   symbolic   supports.   Luce   Irigaray,   for   example,   claims   that   a   woman   “should   not  
comply  with  a  model  of   identity   imposed  on  her  by  anyone,  neither  her  parents,  her   lover,  her  
children,   the   State,   religion   or   culture   in   general.”45   Whereas   patriarchal   culture   does   not  
acknowledge   sexual  difference,   she  aims  at   the   creation  of  a   culture   that   recognizes   the   radical  
embodied   and   symbolic   difference   between   the   sexes,   a   culture   of   sexual   difference.   Each  
woman,   but   also   every   man,   should   be   able   for   her/himself   to   become   her/his   gender.   For  
poststructuralist   Judith   Butler,   also,   the   restrictions   of   the   social   order   are   central   in   her  
theorizing.   She   speaks   of   the   subject’s   “social   existence,”46   and   through   the   notions   of    
“performativity"ʺ  and  “abjection,”  articulates  how  subjects  constitute  themselves  by  relating  to  the  
normative  symbolic,  excluding  other  possibilities.47  She  asks  not  only  what  it  means  for  subjects  
to   constitute   themselves   as   such,   but   also   reflects   upon   the   remainder,   the   rest,   the   abject   that  
might  transform  and  oppose  the  social  norms  that  produce  subject  constitution.  
   In  relating  Ricœur’s  notion  of  the  self  to  the  one  in  feminist  theory,  one  of  the  central  
questions  is  precisely  to  what  extent  this  self  can  be  critical  of  the  stories  and  texts  that  it  refers  to  
in   articulating   itself.   We   have   seen   that   Ricœur   does   not   consider   the   self   as   fixed,   but   as  
changing,   and   that   the   self   articulates   itself   by   reference   to   the   various   texts   in   the   cultural  
symbolic.   But   can   it   also   be   critical   of   these   texts?  And  does  Ricœur   consider   these   texts   to   be  
normative,  i.e.,  do  they  capture  and  limit  the  possibilities  of  becoming  a  self?  In  order  to  answer  
these   questions,   in   the   next   section   I   outline   Ricœur’s   ideas   about   a   critical   hermeneutics,   and  
bring   them   into   dialogue   with   Butler’s   notions   of   performativity   and   abjection   and   with  
Irigaray’s  mimesis.48  
Critical  Hermeneutics,  Performativity  and  Mimesis  
Irigaray  suggests  a  strategy  of  mimesis  –  that  is,  of  playful  and  productive  repetition  -­‐‑  in  
order   to   articulate   the   feminine   that   is   excluded   from  discourse.   In   order   to   “reopen  women’s  
path,  in  particular  in  and  through  language”  -­‐‑  which  she  claims  is  not  an  easy  task  “for  what  path  
can  one   take   to  get  back   inside   their   ever   so   coherent   systems?”   -­‐‑   she  proposes   the  productive  
play   of   mimesis.49   Butler,   in   turn,   claims   that   the   subject   is   “produced   in   and   as   a   gendered  
matrix  of  relations.”  This  does  not  imply  doing  away  with  the  subject,  but  rather  “to  ask  after  the  
conditions   of   its   emergence   and   operation.”50   She   points   at   the   exclusionary   means   through  
which  the  construction  takes  place:  the  set  of  foreclosures,  erasures  that  are  refused  the  possibility  
of  cultural  articulation.  The  “inhuman,”  the  “humanly  unthinkable”  is  produced  at  the  same  time  
as   the   subject,   and   forms   its   constitutive   outside.   Agency,   for   Butler,   is   not   in   the   hands   of   a  
voluntarist   subject   who   exists   apart   from   the   norms   that   it   opposes,   because   the   subject   that  
resists  the  norms  is  itself  “enabled,  if  not  produced”  by  them.  Agency,  rather,  is  “a  reiterative  or  
rearticulatory  practice,  immanent  to  power,  and  not  a  relation  of  external  opposition  to  power.”51  
Both   Irigaray   and   Butler   understand   discourse   as   allowing   the   cultural   articulation   of   some  
subjects,   while   excluding   others.   The   excluded   subjects   are   the   ones   that   cannot   be   named  
“subject,”  because  they  do  not  exist  as  subjects  within  the  prevailing  symbolic.  Yet,  both  thinkers  
consider   different   non-­‐‑subjects   as   non-­‐‑existing:   for   Irigaray   it   is   the   feminine   that   cannot  
articulate   itself  as   feminine  within  a  phallocentric  symbolic;   for  Butler   the  symbolic   is  gendered  
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or  woman.  In  later  works  she  speaks  of  the  exclusion  of  lives  as  inhuman.52  For  both  Irigaray  and  
Butler,   discourse   should   be   criticized   for   what   it   excludes,   and   opened   up   for   novel   ways   of  
articulating   subjectivity.   Does   Ricœur   also   consider   the   possibility   of   change   and   critique   of  
discourse  because  of  what  it  excludes?  I  will  first  discuss  his  account  of  the  possibility  of  critique  
of  discourse,  and  then  his  ideas  about  the  role  of  the  productive  imagination.  
The   critique   of   discourse   is   discussed   by   Ricœur   in   reflecting   upon   the   debate   about  
hermeneutics  and  critique  between  Gadamer  and  Habermas.  In    “Hermeneutics  and  the  Critique  
of   Ideology”   he   asks   whether   a   hermeneutic   philosophy   can   account   for   the   demands   of   a  
critique   of   ideology.  His   thesis   is   that   Gadamer’s   hermeneutics   does   not   recognize   the   critical  
instance,  because   the  hermeneutical  experience   for  Gadamer  refutes  Verfremdung,   the  alienating  
distanciation   that   is  central   for   the  possibility  of  objectivation   in   the  human  sciences  –  which   is  
the  issue  debated  by  Gadamer  and  Habermas.53  Ricœur  takes  a  distance  from  Gadamer,  without  
however  contradicting  him,  by  developing  a  dialectic  between   the  experience  of  belonging  and  
alienating  distanciation.54  
   Ricœur,  first  of  all,  argues  that  distanciation  belongs  to  interpretation,  as  its  condition,  
instead  of  contradicting  it,  as  Gadamer  claims.  Distanciation  is   implicated  in  the  fixation  that   is  
implied  in  writing,  in  the  material  sense,  but  also  because  the  text  is  autonomous  from  its  author  
and   the  meaning   that   (s)he  gives   to   the   text.  Furthermore   it   is   autonomous  with   respect   to   the  
cultural  situation  and  sociological  conditions  of  the  production  of  the  text,  and  with  respect  to  its  
original  addressee.  “The  emancipation  of  the  text  constitutes  the  most  fundamental  condition  for  
the  recognition  of  a  critical  instance  at  the  heart  of  interpretation:  for  distanciation  now  belongs  to  
the  mediation  itself,”  claims  Ricœur.55    It  is  this  idea,  the  possibility  to  distanciate  oneself  from  the  
text,  that  is  also  important  for  Irigaray’s  notion  of  productive  mimesis  and  Butler’s  performativity  
as  variation  on  the  norm,  as  we  will  soon  see.  
   Ricœur,  furthermore,  contends  that  in  hermeneutics  the  text  is  considered  as  opening  
up  a  world  in  itself,  and  that  this  includes  the  possibility  of  critique  of  the  real.  “[T]he  power  of  
the   text   to   open   a   dimension   of   reality   implies   in   principle   a   recourse   against   any   given  
reality…”56   Especially   poetic   discourse   has   this   subversive   power   to   suspend   the   reference   to  
ordinary  language  and  everyday  reality,  and  to  release  a  reference  of  a  second  order.  He  relates  it  
to  Aristotle’s  notion  of  mimèsis,   creative   imitation.  Ricœur  also  explicitly  works  out   the  relation  
between  subjectivity  and  interpretation.  Understanding  oneself  does  not  imply  projecting  oneself  
into  the  text,  but  rather  exposing  oneself  to  it:  “it  is  to  receive  a  self  enlarged  by  the  appropriation  
of  the  proposed  worlds  that  interpretation  unfolds.”  For  Ricœur  “it  is  the  matter  of  the  text  that  
gives  the  reader  his  or  her  dimension  of  subjectivity.”  The  confrontation  with  texts  introduces  the  
self  to  imaginative  variations  of  the  ego.    In  reading  “I  unrealize  myself,”57  he  writes  –  in  words  
that  are  close  to  Butler’s.58  
   With   the   dialectics   between   alienating   distanciation   and   participatory   belonging,  
Ricœur   contends   that   the   self   does   not   coincide  with   the   text   that   it   refers   to   and  uses   for   the  
articulation   of   who   it   is,   but   that   it   rather   reads   itself   in   the   text,   identifies  with   it,   and   finds  
alternative  possibilities  in  it  of  who  it  is.  In  other  words,  the  self  can  interpret  itself  differently  in  
the   light   of   different   texts.   For   Ricœur   discourse   is   the   place   of   unending   variations   for   the  
subject,  it  is  the  field  of  alterations  and  dreams.  The  distanciation  between  subject  and  discourse  
that   he   conceptualizes,   indeed   does   leave   openings   for   critique   and   include   possibilities   for  
change.  His   notion   of   distanciation   helps   to   understand  what   is   needed   in   order   to   create   the  
necessary   space   for   criticizing   discourse,   and   as   such   can   be   of   use   for   feminist   theory.   But   at  
large  his  view  of  discourse  is  different  from  the  one  in  feminist  theory.  
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   As  Andreea  Ritivoi  claims,  Ricœur’s  hermeneutical  theory  includes  a  notion  of  the  text  
as  “a  place  where  different  universes  come  together,  and  at  the  same  time  it  is  a  space  for  trying  
on   different   self-­‐‑identities   as   a  way   of   continuously   enriching   the   identity  we   have.”59   Ricœur  
indeed   thinks   the   possibility   of   creating   alternative   identities   as   an   enrichment   of   the   self.  He  
does  not  so  much  think  about  shifting  the  horizon  of  discourse  in  the  way  that  both  Irigaray  and  
Butler  deem  necessary  for  the  coming  into  existence  of  new  identities.  For  Ricœur  discourse  does  
not  so  much  exclude  possibilities  of  becoming  a  self.  In  other  words,  the  prevailing  cultural  order  
contains   more   opportunities   than   it   does   for   the   feminist   thinkers.   The   latter   are   critical   of   a  
symbolic  order  that  consists  of  representations  that   identify  everyone  in  a  similar  way  and  that  
excludes   other   possibilities   of   becoming.   The   difference   in   the   understanding   of   discourse   of  
Ricœur  and  feminist  thinkers  such  as  Butler  and  Irigaray,  is  that  the  latter  understand  discourse  
to  be  restrictive  and  normative,  while   for  Ricœur   it   forms  a   field  of  opportunities.  Whereas   the  
first  two  claim  that  discourse  should  be  criticized  for  what  it  excludes,  Ricœur  understands  it  as  
enrichment,   as   laboratory   for   thought   experiments.   That   does   not   imply,   however,   that   he  
precludes   the  possibility  of   critique,  or   that  he  does  not   take   into  account   the  opportunities   for  
change  of  discourse.  Interpretation  includes  distanciation,  for  him,  and  distanciation  implies  the  
possibility  of  critique.  
For   both   Irigaray   and   Butler   discourse   has   an   outside:   it   excludes   possibilities   of  
articulation  of  the  self.  They  think  that  the  change  of  discourse  can  only  come  about  in  a  process  
of  repetition,  as  the  notions  of  mimesis  and  performativity  exemplify.  So  far  in  this  section,  I  have  
argued  that  Irigaray  and  Butler  are  opposed  to  Ricœur  in  that  the  first  two  consider  discourse  as  
something   that   should   be   criticized   for  what   it   excludes.   In  what   follows,   I  will   show   another  
similarity  between  feminist  postmodernism  and  Ricœur,  and  will  make  it  productive  for  feminist  
theory.   For   Ricœur’s   notions   of   re-­‐‑   and   productive   imagination,   on   the   one   hand   are   close   to  
Irigaray’s   reproductive   and   productive   mimesis,   and   to   Butler’s   performativity   as   affirmation  
and  displacement  of  existing  normative  claims.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  interrelation  of  the  re-­‐‑
productive  and  productive  imagination  that  Ricœur  perceives  will  also  point  out  the  differences  
between  Irigaray  and  Butler.  
   Irigaray  describes  the  relationship  between  patriarchal  discourse  and  the  possibility  of  
change   through   the   notion   of   mimesis.   She   claims   that   Plato   distinguishes   two   notions   of  
mimesis:   mimesis   as   production,   and   the   mimesis   “that   is   already   caught   up   in   a   process   of  
imitation,  specularization,  adequation,  and  reproduction.”60  For  Irigaray  the  philosophical  tradition  –  
as  thinking  of  the  Same  -­‐‑  has  privileged  the  second  form,  and  repressed  the  first  productive  one.  
It   is   precisely   on   the   basis   of   this   first   form   that   the   articulation   of   the   feminine   and  of   sexual  
difference  can  come  about.  
   Phallocentrism   for   Irigaray   reduces   otherness   to   the   order   of   the   Same.   It   deflects,  
diverts,   and   reduces   the   other.   It   forms   a  mirror   economy   that   only   reduplicates   itself,   reflects  
itself  by  itself.  Woman  supports  this  economy  in  her  functioning  as  mirror  for  the  man.  She  forms  
“the  path,  the  method,  the  theory,  the  mirror,  which  leads  back,  by  a  process  of  repetition,  to  the  
recognition  of  (his)  origin  for  the  ‘subject’.”61  Repetition  of  the  same,  or  also  mimicry,  62  thus  forms  
woman’s   privilege.   Yet,   it   includes   the   danger   that   woman   remains   unreflected   herself.   The  
masculine   economy   limits   her   possibilities   of   becoming:  without   a   feminine   horizon   or  model,  
she  can  only  become  man.63  At  the  same  time,  while  repetition  of  the  same  is  what  characterizes  
the  phallocentric  economy,  there  is  no  other  way  of  opening  it  up  than  by  repetition,  but  this  time  
a  repetition  that  starts  from  what  woman  holds  in  reserve,  from  her  sex  that  is  “heterogeneous  to  
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change  must   come   about   from  what   so   far   has   remained  outside   of   representation.   In   a   rather  
dualistic   manner,   she   separates   repetition   of   the   same   from   productive   repetition.   Productive  
repetition   demands   another   mirror   than   the   flat   one   of   phallocentrism.   Instead,   in   order   to  
become  woman,  “we  need  some  shadowy  perception  of  achievement;  not  a  fixed  objective,  not  a  
One  postulated  to  be  immutable.”65  Woman  needs  her  own  ideal,  her  own  horizon.    
   In   Irigaray’s   work,   the   “bad”   normativity   of   the   phallocentric   symbolic   order   is  
sharply   contrasted  with   the   “good”   normativity   of   a   culture   of   sexual   difference   in  which   the  
feminine   is  capable  of  articulating   itself.   In  contrast   to  Butler,  she  remains  closer   to   the  Marxist  
distinction   between   critique   and   utopia.   Whereas   Irigaray   understands   the   feminine   as   not  
represented   in   discourse,   and   aims   at   finding   ways   to   articulate   what   so   far   has   not   been  
articulated   in   its   own   terms,   Butler   contends   that   discourse   forms   “the   cultural   matrix,”   that  
defines  what   is   intelligible   and  not.   She  understands   the   relation  between   in-­‐‑   and   exclusion   as  
constituting  each  other.     
   Butler’s   notion   of   performativity   indicates   the   reiteration   of   a   norm   or   set   of   norms  
that   is   cited  by  a   subject,   that  on   its   turn  only  becomes  a   subject   in   the  process  of   repetition  of  
these  norms.  In  this  process  of  repetition  also  the  hegemony  of  the  norms  is  produced.  Norms  are  
not  stable,  Butler  rather  thinks  in  terms  of  a  mutual  constitution  of  norms  and  subject.  The  norms  
are  installed  precisely  because  of  being  cited:  “the  norm  of  sex  takes  hold  to  the  extent  that  it  is  
‘cited’  as  such  a  norm,  but  it  also  derives  its  power  through  the  citations  that  it  compels.”66  The  
process  by  which  the  subject  becomes  a  socially  recognizable  subject  implies  that  it  cites  norms,  
and  at  the  same  time  contributes  to  the  dominance  of  those  norms.  Escape  from  the  normativity  
of  these  claims  in  itself  is  not  possible  –  because  becoming  a  socially  existing  subject  entails  citing  
normative   claims   -­‐‑,   but   variations   are   possible   because   of   the   openings   that   the   process   of  
repetition   leaves.   The   performative   process,   according   to   Butler,   in   which   subjects   come   into  
existence,   has   a   rest   or   remainder   that   is   produced   at   the   same   time   as   the   subject.   Inclusion  
creates  its  own  outside.  She  names  this  outside  with  different  names,  such  as  “the  abject”  or  “the  
inhuman.”67  In-­‐‑  and  outside  for  her  are  constituted  at  the  same  time  and  co-­‐‑constitute  each  other.  
Instead   of   opposing   bad   normativity   to   a   utopian   future,   Butler   holds   that   every   discourse  
contains   hegemonic   possibilities   of   articulation   while   excluding   others.   It   is   on   the   basis   of  
repetitious   citing   that   leaves   openings   for   other   citations   and   on   the   basis   that   there   remains  
something   unarticulated   in   the   process   of   articulation,   that   change   of   normative   claims   is  
possible.  
   So  far,  I  have  shown  the  similarities  between  Irigaray  and  Butler,  in  opposing  them  to  
Ricœur.  In  contrast  to  Ricœur  they  consider  discourse  as  something  that  should  be  criticized  for  
what   it  excludes.  Ricœur  does  not  deny   the  possibility  of  change,  but  he  also  does  not  seem  to  
consider   critique  of  discourse  vital   for   the  creation  of  novel  possibilities   for   identification.  That  
said,   I   also   consider  Ricœur’s   thinking   to   have   relevance   for   feminist   theory.   In   particular,   his  
notion   of   productive   imagination   as   differentiated   from   reproductive   imagination   clarifies   the  
possibility   of   the   articulation   of   new   possibilities   for   identification.   In   turning   to   Ricœur’s  
understanding   of   imagination,   I   will   lay   out   the   differences   between   Butler’s   and   Irigaray’s  
account  of  the  relation  between  repetition  of  the  old  and  the  possibility  of  new  identities.  
   As  George  Taylor   specifies,   Ricœur   in   his   unpublished   “Lectures   on   Imagination,”68  
distinguishes   between   reproductive   and  productive   imagination.  Reproductive   imagination   for  
him   is   central   in   the   history   of   Western   Thought.   For   this   notion,   Ricœur   among   other  
philosophers  refers  to  Plato,  for  whom  the  image  preferably  is  a  perfect  copy  of  the  true  concept  
in  the  Ideas.  This  notion  is  close  to  Irigaray’s  reproductive  mimesis,  repetition  of  the  same,  that  
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she  also  derives  from  Plato.  For  the  image,  reproductive  imagination  implies  that  it  is  a  derivative  
from  the  original.  It  includes  having  an  image  of  reality.69  In  productive  imagination,  by  contrast,  
what   is   imagined   is   not   duplicative,   nor   determined   by   an   original.   Instead   it   leads   to   new  
possibilities.  This  notion  is  close  to  Irigaray’s  mimesis  as  production,  and  further  explains  what  
Irigaray  intends.    
   Ricœur  refers  to  social  utopia  to  explain  productive  imagination.  Social  utopia  point  to  
a   new   kind   of   reality,   they   expand   our   sense   of   reality.   Feminist   thinking   also   includes  
utopianism,   in   the   form   of   hope   of   another   future.   As   Seyla   Benhabib   writes,   utopianism  
characterizes   feminist   thinking:   “without   a   regulative   principle   of   hope,   not   only  morality   but  
also  radical  transformation  is  unthinkable.”70  Yet,  she  also  claims  that  postmodern  feminism  has  
produced  a  “retreat   from  utopia.”  Benhabib  clarifies   the  difference  between  modernist  utopias,  
and   the   ones   that   feminism   need.   Utopism   for   her   does   not   imply   the   modernist   idea   of  
restructuring  of  our  social  and  political  universe  according  to  a  rationally  worked  out  plan.  But  
feminism   should   include   a   longing   for   “the  wholly  other,”   for   that  which   is  not   yet.   Irigaray’s  
works  do  display  such  a  non-­‐‑modernist  notion  of  utopia.71  While   Irigaray  resists  being  called  a  
utopian,  she  does  aim  at  what  is  not  yet:  “I  am,  therefore,  a  political  militant  for  the  impossible,  
which   is   not   to   say   an   utopian.   Rather,   I   want   what   is   yet   to   be   as   the   only   possibility   of   a  
future.”72  For  her,  critique  cannot  be  thought  without  the  horizon  of  the  new.  We  need  a  horizon,  
a  perspective  in  order  to  be  able  to  criticize.  Critique  without  an  affirmative  place  for  Irigaray  is  
nihilism  without   a   future.   In   the   case   of  Butler,   the   terms   “utopianism”  and  aiming   at  what   is  
“not  yet”  both  are  too  strong.  Critique  for  her  is  central,  she  aims  at  showing  that  the  subject  is  
“the   permanent   possibility   of   a   certain   resignifying   process,”   and   that   this   process   as   well   as  
producing  the  subject,  also  at  the  same  time  produces  exclusion.73  But  rather  than  claiming  that  
Butler’s   postmodernism   implies   a   “retreat   from   utopia,”   as   Benhabib   writes,   I   contend   that   it  
includes   holding   the   possibilities   for   articulation   as   arising   from   the   exclusion   produced   by  
discourse  itself.  
   Irigaray   separates   reproduction   of   the   same   from   productive   mimesis.   She  
distinguishes    the  first  as  patriarchal  and  masculine,  from  the  second  as  way  to  change;  Butler,  in  
contrast,   diagnoses   discourse   as   including   as  well   as   excluding   at   the   same   time.   Precisely   for  
what   it   excludes,   it   should   be   put   under   critique.   Ricœur’s   relating   of   re-­‐‑   and   productive  
imagination   is   helpful   to   explain   the   differences   between   Irigaray   and   Butler.   Productive  
imagination  is  not  entirely  distinct  from,  but  continuous  with,  reproductive  imagination  for  him.  
As  Taylor   specifies:   “any   transformative   fiction  –  any  utopia,  any  scientific  model,   any  poem  –  
must  have  elements  of  reproductive  imagination,  must  draw  from  existing  reality  sufficiently  so  
that  its  productive  distance  is  not  too  great.”74  If  we  relate  that  to  Irigaray’s  distinction  between  
phallocentrism  or  patriarchy  and   the  culture  of   sexual  difference,   it   can  be  asked  whether   they  
can  be  separated  as  clearly  as  she  claims.  Is  her  utopian  culture  of  sexual  difference  entirely  free  
of  exclusion  and  power  differences?  
   Butler’s  poststructuralist  attempt   to   find   the  possibility  of  change  and  agency  within  
discourse  seems  a  more  viable  alternative.  For  her,  the  issue  is  “to  call  into  question  and,  perhaps  
most   importantly,   to  open  up  a  term  […]  to  a  reusage  or  redeployment  that  previously  has  not  
been   authorized.”75   Rather   than   aiming   at   a   radical   inversion   of   the   symbolic,76   for   Butler   it   is  
within   the  present   symbolic   that  we   should   aim   at   rearticulation   and   redefinition.   She   aims   at  
resignification   of   terms,   such   as   “woman,”      “subject,”   “human.”   Agency,   for   her,   implies  
releasing   terms   of   their   fixed   referents,   opening   them   up   and   making   them   the   site   of  
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Irigaray’s  mimesis  as  repetition  and  production,  her  notions  of  performativity  and  abjection  do  
not   separate   critique   and   utopia,   but   find   openings   for   renewal   within   discourse.   Therewith  
Butler  avoids  the  danger  of  utopias  that  Ricœur  identifies,  namely,  that  they  tend  to  refuse  and  
escape  reality.  As  he  writes  in  his  “Lectures  on  Critique  and  Utopia,”  utopia  displays  alternative  
horizons,   but   yet   includes   disquieting   traits   and   a   tendency   of   escapism,   namely,   submitting  
reality  to  dreams  and  implying  a  logic  of  all  or  nothing.78  
   In  this  section,  my  aim  was  to  reflect  upon  the  critique  of  the  subject  that  Ricœur  and  
the   feminists   share.   Whereas   the   feminist   philosophers   aim   at   critique   of   discourse,   Ricœur  
considers  discourse  a  field  of  opportunities  for  the  articulation  of  new  identities.  But  in  analyzing  
Ricœur’s  ideas  about  the  relation  between  critique  and  hermeneutics,  it  became  apparent  that  for  
him   the   self’s   distanciation   of   discourse   implies   the  possibility   of   critique.  Distanciation   leaves  
openings   for   critique   and   includes   possibilities   for   change.   It   is   precisely   because   self   and  
discourse  do  not  completely  coincide  or  overlap   that   the  self   can  be  critical.  We  have  seen   that  
Irigaray  presumes  a  similar  non-­‐‑coincidence  between  the  feminine  self  and  discourse,  which  for  
her  explains  the  possibility  of  critique.  But  Butler  starts  precisely  from  the  Foucauldian  paradox  
that  the  subject  that  is  produced  by  discourse,  also  is  the  critical  subject.  Criticizing  the  normative  
claims   in  discourse   for   this   subject   implies  putting   itself   in  danger,  because   it   is   constituted  by  
these  claims.    
   In   trying   to   find   out   how   change   can   come   about   for   Ricœur   and   the   feminist  
philosophers,   the   differences   between   Irigaray   and   Butler   came   into   a   brighter   light.   Ricœur’s  
relation   between   re-­‐‑   and  productive   imagination  proved   to   be   helpful   to   differentiate   between  
Irigaray’s  radical  distinction  between  phallocentrism  and  the  utopian  future  of  sexual  difference  
and   Butler’s   shifting   of   the   horizon   of   articulation   on   the   basis   of   what   discourse   in-­‐‑   and  
excludes.  At  this  point,  we  joined  Ricœur’s  interrelation  between  re-­‐‑  and  productive  imagination  
and  Butler,   in  order  to  show  that  articulation  and  what   is  excluded  from  articulation  should  be  
thought  of  not  as  different  realms  of  reality,  but  as  taking  place  at  the  same  time.  
Conclusion  
The  title  of  this  paper  –  “The  Subject  of  Critique”  -­‐‑  refers  to  the  notion  of  the  self  that  is  
shared  by  Ricœur  and  postmodern  feminist  theory,  as  well  as  to  the  theme  of  critique.  Ricœur’s  
works  are  not  often  considered  in  feminist  theory,  but  in  the  light  of  the  similarities  between  their  
notions  of  the  self  -­‐‑  namely  the  views  that  the  self  articulates  itself  in  language,  is  embodied  and  
is  not  fully  conscious  of  itself  –  that  is  peculiar.  Also  the  possibility  of  critique  and  the  need  for  
change  of  discourse,   that   on   first   thoughts   seemed   the  main  point   of  divergence  between  both  
streams  of  thought,  in  a  closer  look  ,  do  not  separate  them.    
For   feminists,   the   existing  discourse   should  be  put  under   critique   for  what   it   excludes.  
They  aim  at  change  of  the  prevailing  symbolic  order.  Their  “self,”  consequently,  is  a  critical  one  
that   does   not   repeat   “the   same,”   but   that   opens   new   possibilities   of   articulation.   Although  
critique  is  perhaps  not  central  for  Ricœur,  his  notion  of  hermeneutics  includes  its  possibility:  his  
notion   of   the   text   intrinsically   incorporates   distanciation   and   critique   of   the   real.   His   “self”   is  
capable   of   distanciating   itself   from   the   texts   that   it   articulates   itself   in,   and   finds   new  
opportunities  for  understanding  itself  in  them.    
Apart   from   these   similarities,   Ricœur’s   conceptualizations   are   fertile   for   postmodern  
feminist   thinking.   His   dialectics   between   alienating   distanciation   and   participatory   belonging  
answers  Butler’s  claim  that  the  subject  that  is  produced  by  discourse  also  puts  it  under  critique,  
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thereby   questioning   its   own   conditions   for   existence.   For  Ricœur   it   is   not   a   problem,   precisely  
because   the   self  does  not   coincide  with   the   text   that   it   refers   to  and  uses   for   the  articulation  of  
who  it  is.  Also,  Irigaray’s  notion  of  mimesis  as  production  can  profit  from  Ricœur’s  conception  of  
“productive   imagination.”   Instead  of   strictly  separating  reproductive   from  productive  mimesis,  
and  identifying  them  as  patriarchal  repetition  of  the  same  versus  creation  of  the  utopian  culture  
of   sexual   difference,   Irigaray   could   also   consider   both   as   related.   Then,   in   Ricœur’s   words,  
Irigaray   would   no   longer   think   in   terms   of   a   logic   of   all   or   nothing,   and   exclude   power  
differences   from  her   culture  of   sexual  difference.      So,   except   from  being  close   to   feminist   ideas  
about  the  self,  I  hope  to  have  shown  that  Ricœur’s  phenomenological  hermeneutics  is  also  fertile  
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